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A Big Stick, an Equally Big Carrot 
Hannah Fishman 
October 7, 11 
Professor Andrew Latham 
POLI-220- Chinese Foreign Policy 
What will be the systemic consequences of China’s rise? 
 
There is much speculation within the international community regarding 
China’s newfound assertiveness and the potential threat it could pose to the current 
balance of powers. Since scholars suspect China will reach its demographic potential 
within in the next twenty years, policy experts are tasked with the urgent question 
of the systemic consequences of China’s rise. Few dispute that China is in fact 
rising—a rise that many officials and state leaders believe to be inevitable. Indeed, 
this paper will not debate claims on whether China is or isn’t rising—there are too 
many political, economic, and social measures that clearly favor the rising China 
argument to regress into that discussion. However, the consequences of China’s rise 
remain uncertain and at the forefront of international debate. While many countries 
and experts fall into the slippery slope of  “crystal ball” guessing games regarding 
China’s assertiveness, it is nonetheless important to analyze the systemic 
consequences of China’s rise as a means of offering more focused and detailed policy 
recommendations for the future.  In order to understand the implications of China’s 
rise and the potential impact these might have on the political landscape, it is 
necessary to answer three questions: what does china’s rise look like? What is 
China’s trajectory and does this constitute a threat? And finally, what policies best 
respond to these realities? 
In this paper I will argue that China’s rise in power is guided by a policy I call 
“building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot.” This twofold policy seeks to increase 
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both hard and soft power, which combined creates a system of incentives while also 
deterring actors through military might. By understanding Chinese current foreign 
policy strategy as it relates to Beijing’s global rise, we can better evaluate whether 
China will use its position to pursue a policy of global domination or, alternatively, 
assume its position as a “good institutional citizen” within the liberal international 
system. Policy recommendations will be aimed at guiding China to assume the latter 
position and I argue that strengthening Western-central international institutions 
can accomplish this best.  
 Much of the concern regarding Chinese assertiveness stems from China’s 
growing ability to project power. The past couple decades have witnessed a steady 
increase in Chinese hard and soft power—perhaps both intentionally and 
unintentionally. The result is what I would call a “building a bigger stick and a bigger 
carrot” foreign policy. To this point, China is not only building up its tangible 
military and economic power but also strengthening its soft power appeal by 
growing its capacity to influence others. The “building a bigger stick and a bigger 
carrot” approach positions China at the center of strategic alliances held together by 
a program of incentives and deterrence. By examining the ways in which China 
pursues a “building a bigger stick and bigger carrot” plan, policy makers can better 
tailor a foreign policy strategy that incorporates and responds to Chinese hard and 
soft power realities.  
 In the last two decades China embarked on a conspicuous program of 
military modernization. Military modernization should not come as a surprise or as 
a threat necessarily—“China is still decades away from challenging U.S. military’s 
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preeminence…[and has] significant shortcomings in command and control, air 
defense, logistics, and communications”1. China recognizes that its current military 
lacks the sufficient strength and sophistication to fight a major war outside of 
China’s coasts and, thus, has dedicated itself to building a military capable of 
defending its core interests. 
China’s growth in military currently appears benign as long as it remains 
within the framework of defending core interests; however, there is much concern 
and anxiety among policy officials and analysts who worry that a military buildup 
might pose a more bellicose threat in the future. These are not unreasonable 
concerns for a few reasons. First, the most conspicuous indication of Chinese 
military modernization is its 2008 defense budget of $61 billion. The U.S. Defense 
Department believes Chinese military spending to be even higher than this estimate 
since in 2007 the Chinese reported a budget $52 billion, whereas the Defense 
Department estimated a spending range between $97 and $139 billion2. Beijing’s 
increased spending funded “a large, increasingly capable submarine fleet, and air 
force stocked with Russian warplanes, and technical strides which have improved 
China’s ballistic missile arsenal”3. China recently announced its commitment to 
                                                        
1 Jayshree Bajoria, “China’s Military Power,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4 February 
2009, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-military-power/p18459 1. 
 
2 Jayshree Bajoria, “Countering China’s Military Modernization,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, 4 February 2009, http://www.cfr.org/china/countering-chinas-military-
modernization/p9052 1. 
 
3 Ibid. 
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deploy an aircraft carrier force in a move to build its “blue water” navy capacities4. 
China is currently the only veto power on the Security Council without an aircraft 
carrier, and thus this measure to modernize the navy may simply be “a symbol of 
China’s great-power status”5. However, many U.S. officials remain suspicious of 
China’s intentions and believe China’s motivation to modernize its navy is more 
complicated than a power-play with fellow Security Council countries. 
As China increases its military might, it is important to consider Beijing’s 
predisposition for defense and no-first-attack policy. While “building a big stick” 
may be important for deterrence, it is equally important for China to  “build a big 
carrot” in order to create incentives that persuade states to act in ways favorable to 
China. References to American soft power often speak to forms of cultural capital— 
perhaps the ubiquity of McDonalds or the proliferation and appeal of Hollywood. 
This is a somewhat narrow definition of soft power— one that doesn’t resemble 
China’s type of growing soft power. As a definition, soft power “refers to a nation 
winning influence abroad by persuasion and appeal rather than by threats or 
                                                        
4 James Holmes, “Blue Water Dreams,” Foreign Policy, 27 June 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/blue_water_dreams 1.  
 
5 Abraham M. Denmark, Andrew S. Erickson, Gabriel Collins, “ Should We Be Afraid 
of China’s New Aircraft Carrier?”,  Foreign Policy, 27 June 2011. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/should_we_be_afraid_of_china
s_new_aircraft_carrier 2. 
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military force”6. This can include “a country’s culture, political values, foreign 
policies, and economic attraction”7.  
China’s most powerful and growing form of soft power is its relationships 
with African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries. These relationships 
build on political and economic cooperation and entanglement that emphasize 
“mutual interests” through development, resource sharing, and technical support.  
Unlike the Western or American model, China’s soft power appeal stems from its 
“no string attached” approach that doesn’t does believe that political or military 
reform are necessary compliments to development. Beijing’s acceptance of many 
paths to development poses a stark contrast to American engagement and 
diplomacy. The conspicuous influx of Chinese doctors, Chinese construction 
managers, and Chinese teachers in foreign countries manifests the broad influence 
and reach of Chinese soft power. Whether consciously or subconsciously, these 
forms of engagement engender a greater fascination with Chinese culture and 
further promulgate Chinese influence abroad. 
China’s increase in hard and soft power is undeniable and China’s rise can be 
defined best as a program aimed at “building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot.” 
Before examining the systemic consequences of this rise, it is important to first 
evaluate whether this hyper-stick and carrot approach could prove powerful 
                                                        
6 Ester Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 May 
2006. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-power-initiative/p10715 1. 
 
7 Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to 
Health Diplomacy,” The Jamestown Foundation, 13 October, 2005, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/051013_china_soft_pwr.pdf 2. 
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enough to pose a systemic threat. This analysis is necessary since there are limits to 
both China’s hard and soft power that could restrict China from posing a existential 
challenge. In the case of soft power, many policy officials question how far Chinese 
“soft” influence can extend if Beijing remains an undemocratic power. First, China’s 
domestic disorder best exposes its undemocratic policies, and allied-countries “see 
that China suffers from endemic corruption, internal dissent and repressive 
governance”8.  Second, Beijing’s policy of “see no evil,” which allows China to turn a 
blind eye to partner countries’ troubles of political unrest and tyranny, greatly 
tarnishes Beijing’s soft power. And finally, security-related measurements continue 
to define much of China’s contemporary influence, which emphasizes the ceilings to 
China’s soft power unless it adopts democratic principles9. In regards to hard power, 
Chinese capabilities remain equally limited. Currently China’s military 
modernization proves more symbolic than threatening—Beijing’s simplistic 
capacities lack a real ability to defend. That China acquires one aircraft carrier 
means little to the United States since it poses no current threat to the United States’ 
sophisticated blue water navy. Because of China’s unsustainable practices and 
tangible limits to its soft and hard power, China’s rise may not have systemic 
consequences. However, this paper will proceed by evaluating the possibility of 
China’s rise having systemic ramifications. 
The consequences of Beijing’s  “building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot” 
policy will be dependent on the weight given to this two-pronged policy. Beijing 
                                                        
8 Ester Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 May 
2006. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-power-initiative/p10715 3. 
 
9 Ibid 4. 
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now has the choice of pursuing a “big stick” policy, a “big carrot” strategy, or some 
combination of both.  Regardless of which direction China heads, what remains true 
for all  scenarios is the dramatic impact each will have on the global community and 
international order. I offer my speculations regarding the consequences of the most 
extreme directions of China’s rise and then suggest the best policies for the United 
States to pursue in order to prevent such materializations. 
If China decides to pursue a “big stick” policy in the future, it’s motivation 
would likely stem from the desire to deny U.S. access to Southeast Asian waters, 
shape geostrategic realities in the region to align with Chinese interests, and compel 
neighbors to accept Chinese regional hegemony. This type of grand strategy doesn’t 
necessarily indicate that China will use its “big stick,” but it does suggest a more 
assertive China willing to showcase its military might through coercive deterrence. 
The results would be twofold. First, through coercive deterrence China would have 
the means to “wield a club” of countries that unconditionally support Beijing’s 
decisions. This would resemble contemporary U.S. alliances and relationships that 
are built on military needs and protection. This, however, raises the concern that if 
China’s “club” directly opposed the U.S. “club” that the ramifications would be a Cold 
War like bloc system, with each club competing for neutral states’ support. The 
second consequence also resembles the Cold War landscape, an environment where 
“building the big stick” results in a quasi-arms race. A Chinese increase its military 
strength would likely compel the United States to do so as well, producing a pattern 
of action, counteraction, and counter-counteraction. Both country’s need to project 
power in unconventional ways could result in the weaponization of space. While 
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these are all speculations, if China decides to use the “big stick” component of its 
current rise, the systemic consequences are troublingly similar to the Cold War 
period—an epoch that the international community should not rush to recreate. 
Thus, U.S. policy towards China’s rise should aim to shape Chinese thinking about its 
military future by integrating it into the international system that provides its own 
“club,” therefore reducing the need for China to wield its own club. 
An alternative policy would be one that emphasizes China’s “big carrot” 
strategy. This would proliferate the “Beijing Consensus” and similarly build a 
coalition of states easily persuaded by China’s soft power politics. As China 
continues to expand its influence across the global through its “no strings attached 
policy,” Beijing’s disregard for state political unrest, oppression, and governmental 
tyranny would likely produce a “dictators club.” China’s engagement in the Middle 
East, African, and Latin America seemingly “fills the gaps” where the United States 
has not been willing to involve itself to due ideological disparities. By aligning itself 
with Ahmadinejad and al-Bashir, China makes a conscious decision to sideswipe the 
West and create its own alliance of powers. Similar to the consequences of a hard 
power strategy, the resulting political landscape would likely resemble the Cold 
War’s unstable bloc system. A soft power approach appears as dismal a 
consequence as a hard power strategy, and thus U.S policies must harness the 
productive functions of Chinese soft power in order to dissuade Beijing from 
building a “dictators’ club” willing to challenge U.S. interest. 
 These two strategies manifest the most extreme and bleak systemic 
outcomes of China’s rise. The examples of a “big stick” or “big carrot” approach 
8
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assume that a rising China will be interested in global hegemony and countering 
American influence and power. However, “China’s rise can be peaceful, but this 
outcome is far from guaranteed”10. It is not too late for contemporary U.S. foreign 
policy toward Beijing to guide and ensure a benign Chinese rise. First, the United 
States must accept the fact that China is “building a bigger stick and a bigger 
carrot”—I see no policy measures that could interrupt Chinese modernization and 
global reach, and therefore the U.S. must focus its policies around this reality. With 
this in mind, I defend John Ikenberry’s recommendation, which believe that by 
strengthening Western, liberal institutions, China “can gain full access to and thrive 
within the system. And if it does, China will rise, but Western order—if managed 
properly—will live on”11. If the United States attempts to reinvigorate the 
international order with western, liberal ideals, both China’s hard and soft power 
will find a place within this framework as a good institutional citizen. Beijing’s 
modernizing military could be harnessed for humanitarian purposes, rescue 
missions, and international security. Likewise, China’s soft power pursuits could be 
incorporated into international development agencies and multilateral institutions, 
perhaps even with the opportunity to offer its “no strings attached” as a reform 
model. Through integration into modern system of global governance, China will 
reap the benefits of policies of goodwill and likely be steered towards a democratic 
path. If China wishes to resemble the other four veto powers on the Security Council, 
                                                        
10 Charles Glaser, 2011, "Will china's rise lead to war? Why realism does not mean 
pessimism", Foreign Affairs. 90 (2), 7. 
 
11 G.J. Ikenberry, 2008, "The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal 
system survive?" Foreign Affairs, 87 (1): 1 
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it must go beyond just building a blue water navy and aircraft carrier, since being a 
world power means assuming global responsibility and using your big stick and big 
carrot for international stability. 
 China is undeniably on the rise—the past decades witnessed a stark increase 
in China’s tangible military and economic power as well as its global recognition and 
persuasion. Beijing’s amplification of both hard and soft power projects can be 
characterized by a policy I refer to as “building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot.” 
This strategy combines incentives with deterrence in a way that makes partnership 
with Beijing both strategic and threatening. Since China won’t realistically challenge 
the United States’ capabilities or influence for another twenty years, U.S. policy 
officials have time to formulate a strategy that guides China’s hard and soft into a 
framework of liberal international institutions. The only way to do so will be by 
strengthening the Western-centered system of international governance. While it 
may be difficult to persuade Americans experts to lessen the microscope on China, 
only through focused attention to reviving the Western order will China’s rise be 
benign, if not beneficial to the international system. 
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